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5.1. No security
Many IMDs, particularly the older generations without wireless 
communication capabilities, have no security mechanisms at all 
[78,80]. This is unacceptable for the newest generations of IMDs 
in which the presence of communication capabilities may jeopar
dize the patient’s safety.
5.2. Auditing
One of the simplest security mechanisms consists of constantly 
registering all accesses authorized or not together with the 
patient’s status. This is a measure aimed at facilitating the detec
tion of non permitted actions and constitutes a valuable source 
of evidences to take subsequent actions. Therefore, auditing helps 
to combat threats against non repudiation. Unlikely, it does not 
prevent the occurrence of attacks, but may act as a deterrent ele
ment if appropriately implemented, i.e., if it is not possible for an 
attacker to compromise the audit log and if it facilitates attribution 
of the attack. As a consequence of this, this sort of solutions should 
be complemented with appropriate mechanisms to detect and 
block such attacks, as well as measures to prevent them from hap
pening in the ﬁrst place (e.g., cryptographic or access control 
solutions).
The main problem that auditing proposals face is the limited 
amount of memory available in IMDs. For instance, the whole 
memory of an ICD is less than 1 MB and around 75% of this mem
ory is used for medical functions. In that a case, only a few hun
dreds kilobytes could be used for logging events, which is 
extremely restricted. An additional memory could be added to 
the chip, but this would increase the size of the IMD, which is 
not recommendable.
To avoid increasing the memory of IMDs, the logging task can 
rely on an external device without memory and computation lim
itations. One example in the context of RFID systems is ‘‘RFID 
Guardian’’ [95], which collects and analyzes evidences of all events 
that occur in a predetermined range. A similar approach, called 
MedMon, has been recently proposed for IMDs and e Health appli
cations [130]. The authors propose the use of an external device 
that works as a security monitor snooping and analyzing all com
munications to and from the IMD. The events are locally stored in 
the external device and an alarm could be raised to alert the 
patient. A more drastic solution can include blocking the commu
nication channel if a dangerous communication is detected.
5.3. Cryptographic measures
Cryptography based security solutions strongly depend on 
cryptographic primitives, which can be categorized in three main 
groups [82], as shown in Fig. 5. Unkeyed primitives, such as hash 
functions or one way permutations, are cryptographic tools that 
do not use any key. Within the keyed cryptographic tools we can 
distinguish between symmetric key and public key primitives. In 
symmetric key primitives a secret key is shared between the 
trusted entities. The type of primitives in this category is varied 
including symmetric key ciphers (block and stream ciphers), mes
sage authentication codes (MACs), pseudorandom sequences and 
identiﬁcation primitives. On the other hand, public key ciphers 
and signatures are two examples of asymmetric key primitives. 
In this type of algorithms two keys are used, one of them is public 
and the other one must be kept secret.
In the context of IMDs, cryptographic measures are effective 
mechanisms to protect the wireless communication channel and 
the records stored in the device against tampering and information 
disclosure. Additionally, cryptographic protocols also provide a 
means to control and manage accesses to the IMD, thus providingprotection against spooﬁng and, in some cases, elevation of privi
lege attacks. Both symmetric [44,55] and public key [25,112] 
schemes have been proposed for these applications, although the 
latter are considerably more expensive in terms of communication, 
computation, and power consumption. Protocols based on public
key cryptographic schemes often exchange a high number of 
messages, which makes them quite energy demanding since 
sending and receiving messages consume power. Furthermore, 
public key ciphers result in complex circuits that consume exces
sive resources (hardware and memory) and are inefﬁcient in terms 
of power consumption [35,71]. Due to the resource limitations dis
cussed above for the current generation of implants, solutions 
based on symmetric key approaches are the preferred option. 
Standardized protocols like the one proposed in ISO/IEC 9798 rely 
on the use of symmetric primitives (i.e., symmetric encryption or 
keyed hash function) and the encrypted tokens include random 
numbers (a PRNG is often used for its generation) to guarantee 
freshness between sessions [59].
Symmetric cryptographic schemes suffer from the key distribu
tion problem. In general, the IMD and other authorized devices 
such as the programmer need to share a key (or a set of keys) that 
is used to generate authentication tokens for gaining access to the 
IMD, and to encrypt communications. The suitability of a particular 
key distribution scheme depends on the type of IMD, the expected 
interactions with other parties, and other assumptions about the 
operational environment. For example, if the programmer and 
the IMD will have a lasting relationship, a pre set key can be used. 
This solution could be valid when the programmer is always a 
device belonging to the patient or the physician. In these cases, a 
ﬁrst approach consists of pre loading a factor key on the autho
rized devices. This factor might be renegotiated between the legit
imate parties during the ﬁrst communication session to update the 
key. We emphasize here that is crucial to protect these keys and 
guarantee that only authorized entities (i.e., the patient and 
healthcare staff) have access to the them [106]. Such keys will be 
used to build various cryptographic tokens (e.g., an authenticated 
token or an encrypted message) used in the transactions between 
legitimate entities in the system.
Other solutions suggest that the cryptographic keys used by the 
IMD can be stored in an external wearable device such as a smart 
bracelet. Externalizing the key storage incurs a signiﬁcant risk, as 
the loss of such a device (e.g., if the patient losses the bracelet or it 
gets damaged) would render the IMD inaccessible and/or will 
facilitate access to unauthorized users [32]. Some authors propose 
to print the key into the patient’s skin using ultraviolet pigmenta
tion (i.e., invisible tattoos) that can be read by medical personnel in 
case of emergency [103]. Note, however, that the keys might be 
read by an attacker who has physical access to the patient its 
presence may be detected due to its proximity.
In the case of sporadic communications with authorized devices 
that nonetheless do not know the access key, a key agreement pro
tocol must be supported (e.g., RSA based [112] or using physiolog
ical signals [117]).
Providing a conﬁdential channel between the IMD and the pro
grammer is another major goal when using cryptographic solu
tions. Some approaches suggest to exploit the limited coverage of 
the physical layer during the initialization phase [74]. Most pro
posals are based on symmetric ciphers [44], and some of them 
incorporate a key updating mechanism (e.g, a hash chain based 
updating scheme [50]). Recently, Kaadan and Refai have proposed 
in [64] a novel cryptographic system with claimed military grade 
security level that combines a one time pad cipher with a novel key 
distribution and authentication scheme. Other approaches, like the 
one discussed in [55], focus on hardware efﬁciency and pro pose 
the use of lightweight ciphers that offer tiny footprints with low 
power consumption. Recently, a new IMD architecture,10
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Distance based solutions assume that a reader that is close to
the IMD is not an adversary. It can be a legitimate programmer
with the required credentials and within permitted range for nor
mal mode. Alternatively, it could be a legitimate reader but with
out the authorization tokens in an emergency condition and
located very close (i.e., in emergency range) to the IMD. This leads
to two major disadvantages that have not being considered by this
sort of protocols:
 The IMD can be compromised if the adversary is within the
deﬁned range. It would be desirable to guarantee the security
of the patient independently of the distance an attacker can
be. There are many daily situations in which the attacker can
get very close to the IMD, such as in a public transport vehicle
and at the ofﬁce. In other cases, the attacker can plant a pro
grammer device close enough to the patient’s body and use it
as a proxy for conducting his activities. Moreover, the attacker
can be the patient himself trying to deliberately manipulate
the IMD.
 There are techniques that allow an adversary to simulate being
within the permitted range when in reality he is at a longer dis
tance. This is a key limitation for any protocol based exclusively
on the computed distance.
5.4.5. Biometric measures
Biometrics refers to a number of identiﬁcation techniques based 
on the patient’s physical characteristics, such as his ﬁngerprint, iris 
pattern, voice, and hand [8,92]. Interested readers can ﬁnd in [77] 
more details about the use of biometrics in the healthcare context.
In [51], Hei and Du propose a solution that restricts access to 
authorized entities and deals with emergency situations where the 
patient can be unconscious or not holding his credentials (e.g., an 
external authorization token). The scheme uses biometric features 
from the patient in two separate steps or levels. Level 1 employs 
basic biometric information, such as ﬁngerprints, iris color, and the 
patient’s weight. Once level 1 is passed, level 2 authentication must 
be passed too in order to ﬁnally get access to the device. For that, 
biometric information extracted from the patient’s iris must be 
provided. That information is pre stored as a key in the memory of 
the IMD. Iris based authentication has a high accuracy and is very 
efﬁcient. Furthermore, to obtain a good snapshot of the iris a near 
infrared camera is needed, and the user has to be at a distance of 
between ﬁfty and seventy centimetres, which is a very short range. 
As consequence of this, the patient would easily detect an attacker 
due to his proximity in many situations.
Similarly, in [127] Xu et al. propose the use of ECG (electrocar
diograms) signals to generate the patient’s secret key. By using this 
the scheme avoids the need for pre stored keys and the associated 
key distribution problem. Access control is guaranteed by a crypto
graphic protocol that employs this ECG based key. On the other 
hand, communications between the IMD and the reader are coor
dinated by an external device named IMDGuard that is very similar 
to the RFID Guardian proposed in [95]. The presence of the 
IMDGuard means that the IMD works under normal mode and 
ECG based access control is used. When the IMDGuard is absent, 
communications are not protected and access control is not 
enforced, which would allow anyone (e.g., medical personnel in 
an emergency situation, but also an adversary) to interact with 
the implant. A recent and detailed study about the use of ECG sig
nals for key generation can be found in [99].
In certain cases, biometric techniques can be easier to apply 
than solutions based on shared keys, since the key distribution 
problem is avoided and it is harder for the attacker to disclose 
the keys. In principle, the adversary could not impersonate the pro
grammer or the IMDGuard unless he has physical contact with thepatient. Despite this, biometric based approaches have two main
drawbacks:
 Firstly, the physical presence of the patient is needed. This is 
certainly not a disadvantage in an emergency situation, where 
the patient is physically located in the emergency room or 
equivalent. Unfortunately, this is not the case when medical 
personnel will attempt to access the IMD remotely.
 Secondly, biometric features are never perfect. Two measures 
taken at different times, or even acquired simultaneously but 
using two reading devices, could generate different results. A 
straightforward use of such measures might generate wrong 
keys, when in reality the user is authorized. Error correction 
techniques are used to avoid this [2,14]. This problem is known 
as truth rejection rate and implies that not all biometric data 
can be used for key generation (or authentication). Thus, the 
measure has to be gathered from body parts so that the differ 
ences between measures are within a acceptable range and can 
be corrected [13].
5.5. Anomaly detection
The availability of the IMD functions is crucial since the treat
ment and even the patient’s life can be compromised otherwise. 
If an attack is detected, the patient can be informed (e.g., by a noti
ﬁcation mechanism) or the device can be rendered inaccessible via 
switching off the communications (or jamming the channel) while 
the medical functions are kept running. The difﬁculty to prevent 
this sort of attacks mainly arises from the use of the wireless com
munication channel. Communication between the IMD and the 
reader starts with the IMD authenticating the reader. If the reader 
does not pass the authentication step, the communication is inter
rupted. This consumes resources in the IMD and, therefore, can be 
exploited by an adversary who, for example, repeatedly attempts to 
communicate with the IMD. The result would be a classical Denial
of Service (DoS) attack in which the battery level could be 
drastically reduced and memory/storage could be also affected in 
each authentication, some registers are used to store security 
values such as session tokens and logs. In general, this sort of 
attacks are known as Resource Depletion (RD) attacks and focus on 
wasting the resources of the IMD [57]. They are very easy to 
implement and their consequences can be very harmful as the bat
tery life of the IMD could be shortened from several yeas to a few 
weeks just by sending dummy requests.
Standard cryptographic solutions do not prevent these attacks, 
and existing studies about RD attacks in sensors networks [94] are 
not directly applicable to IMDs since implants have more sev ere 
resource restrictions. Moreover, there is an extra difﬁcultly for 
adding new resources the implant is within the body, which is not 
the case of sensor networks. This motivates the need for designing 
solutions that take into account the fact that these devices will be 
used within a human body.
In the context of IMDs, the combined use of pattern/behavior 
analysis and notiﬁcation systems is the most widely used solution 
to counter RD attacks. Notiﬁcation systems inform the patient 
through an alarm signal (e.g., a sound or vibration) when particular 
events happen, such as when the IMD establishes communication 
with a external device [43] or when certain biomedical parameters 
fall out of the normal range [23]. Such alarms are only informative. 
Thus, notiﬁcation does not prevent attacks from happening, 
although alerting the patient may be valuable to make him aware 
of unexpected ongoing communication activity. One major draw
back of these approaches is that they do not work properly in 
acoustically noisy environments. Besides, alarms have an associ
ated energy consumption that should not be underestimated. As13
in the case of auditing, notiﬁcation mechanisms alone are insufﬁ
cient and should be complemented with other solutions.
By leveraging the fact that the wireless communications 
between an IMD and a reader follow a set of observable patterns 
(e.g., frequency, localization, patient conditions, etc.), Hei et al. pro
pose in [52] a mechanism against RD attacks with an average 
detection rate over 90%. The scheme uses a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM), which is assumed to run in the patient’s phone. 
In detail, the authors consider ﬁve kinds of input data to carry 
out detection: reader action type (i.e., the action(s) the reader 
can execute on the IMD, where the set of actions depends on the 
type of implant); the time interval of the same reader action; the 
location (e.g., home or hospital); the time; and the day (e.g., weekly 
or weekend). Once trained, the classiﬁer will determine whether a 
pattern is valid or not. For instance, if a particular type of request is 
always sent from the doctor ofﬁce, an attempt of the same request 
from a different location would raise an alarm. The overall system 
works as follows. Each time the reader attempts to contact with 
the IMD, the latter sends a message to the mobile phone of the 
patient with the access pattern. The phone executes the classiﬁca
tion algorithm and returns an output that is sent back to the IMD. 
Depending on that output, three actions are possible: (1) the input 
vector is considered legitimate. In this case the mobile sends a ‘‘1’’ 
(true) to the IMD and the communication with the reader contin
ues; (2) the input vector does not correspond with any of the 
allowed patterns, in which case the phone sends a ‘‘0’’ (false). 
The request may come from an attacker and the IMD turns into 
sleep mode to avoid RD attacks; (3) If it is unclear whether the 
input vector is legitimate or an attack, an alarm is triggered (e.g., 
an audible alarm) to inform the patient, who must decide if the 
communication is permitted.
The proposal in [52] has three main drawbacks. Firstly, the 
scheme assumes that the IMD is always running in normal mode 
and does not consider emergency conditions in which legitimate 
access patterns could be certainly anomalous. If that is the case, 
access to the IMD would be rejected, which could result in severe 
consequences for the patient’s safety. Secondly, the proposal inher
its some disadvantages from schemes that base its security on an 
external device the mobile phone, in this case, as discussed in 
Section 5.4.2. Finally, but not less important, the patient has the 
responsibility of making a decision in case the SVM cannot classify 
the input data.
Instead of using patterns, Henry et al. have recently proposed in 
[53] a system to detect malicious/anomalous use of an insulin 
pump. In particular, the administration of insulin dosages is 
detected by tracking the acoustic bowel sounds. The events are 
logged and then used for checking the proper system operation. 
The proposal is a passive solution and does not offer protection 
in real time. Moreover, as in [52], the system is based on the use 
of an external device needed to measure abdominal sounds.
A new defense method for IMDs based on wireless monitoring 
and anomaly detection is proposed in [130]. The authors propose 
the use of a medical security monitor, named MedMon, which 
eavesdrops communications to and from the IMD. Captured trafﬁc 
is then passed for analysis to a multi layer anomaly detection sys
tem. If a malicious transaction is detected, the user can be 
informed (passive response) or alternatively the system can render 
the IMD inaccessible via active jamming (active response). 
Jamming refers to the transmission of radio signals with the pur
pose of impeding communications in the channel by reducing 
the signal to noise ratio. In this case, jamming is used to protect 
the IMD from being accessible to the adversary. The main draw
back of this proposal is that the whole security resides on an exter
nal device, but it has the advantage of being applicable on existingdevices without any modiﬁcation. In line with MedMon, Darji and 
Trivedi have recently proposed a system for detecting active attacks 
[18]. They propose the use of an external proxy device equipped 
with several antennas that builds a signature of autho rized 
readers/programmers based on their position. Positions are 
estimated through triangulation techniques. The proposal seems 
effective for static scenarios but not for dynamic ones.
5.6. Overriding access control
Although strictly speaking overriding access control mecha
nisms is not a protection measure, we have included these solu
tions here for completeness. Furthermore, in an emergency 
situation keeping the patient alive is more crucial than maintaining 
the IMD security protections fully functioning.
Access control models are often too inﬂexible. The access policy 
is generally established at the design phase, setting what actions 
are allowed, by which entities and under what circumstances. 
However, during the system life it is possible that unexpected 
and unanticipated situations may arise in which access to the 
implant is vital. For instance, in the context of IMDs and under 
an emergency condition the usage scenarios are unpredictable. 
Since guaranteeing the patient’s safety is a priority, it is mandatory 
that access requirements can be removed if it becomes necessary. 
This type of situations give rise to a family of solutions collectively 
known as ‘‘Breaking the Glass’’ (BTG) that allows to switch the 
access control requirements off in critical or unknown situations 
for the system. This would facilitate the access to the implant 
under a emergency condition, although it also opens the door to 
a number of security vulnerabilities.
A typical proposal of a BTG policy can be found in [29]. Even 
though this work is not focused on IMDs, it can be adapted easily. In 
this case, the access controls requirements can be suppressed even 
if the entity previously did not have privileges to do that. The BTG is 
complemented with a non repudiation mechanism that facilitates 
a subsequent analysis of the accesses carried out. The authors 
deﬁne a series of steps that must be executed in a precise order to 
override access control. First, when a user requests access, the 
system checks if he has the required privileges. If the answer is 
negative, the system may give him access under the BTG modality 
provided that the user accepts that all the actions will be recorded. 
If so, he gets access to the system and assume all responsibilities.
In [97], Rissanen et al. propose a model that distinguishes 
between allowed actions, forbidden actions, and all those that 
can be executed (possible actions). The intersection between the 
sets of possible and forbidden actions represents the actions that 
can be allowed when overriding the access control policy.
The classical Clark Wilson access control model for data integ
rity [15] also provides a reference framework for BTG policies. In 
this case, the basic steps needed in a BTG system are reduced to 
[7]:
1. Pre staging break glass accounts: emergency accounts are cre
ated in advance, so users and passwords are generated for these
special cases.
2. Distributing accounts: pres stages accounts are efﬁciently man
aged to guarantee that the required access data is available in
appropriate and reasonable manner in case of emergency.
3. Monitoring the usage of the accounts: the systemmust be audited
while being accessed during an emergency condition.
4. Cleaning up: once access in the emergency mode concludes, new
access accounts are generated and the old ones are revoked,
thus avoiding temporary authorized users have a permanent
access to the system.14
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